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Abstract
This paper analyses rms behaviour towards compatibility and the relation of these
decisions with their incentives to invest into improving their durable, network goods. By
using a sequential game where the dominant rm plays rst, we give its competitor the
ability to build on innovations previously introduced by the market leader. Recognizing
the intertemporal linkage in forward looking customerspurchasing choices, we nd that in
anticipation of a relatively large quality improvement by the rival, strategic pricing leads
the dominant rm to support compatibility even if it could exclude its rivals by using a
patent for its invention. Furthermore, not only doesnt interoperability de-facto maximise
social welfare but we also identify no market failure when network e¤ects are not particularly
strong.
Keywords: Firms, Pricing, Compatibility, Innovation, Technological Change, Intellectual
Property Rights, Antitrust Law, Competition, Externalities, Product Durability, Welfare
JEL classication: D43, L13, D71, D62, L15, L4, K21, L51, O34, O31.
1 Introduction
Should dominant rms in economies with durable, network goods like software markets,
have the duty to provide technical compatibility information to direct competitors? This
1Department of Economics; University of Warwick.
2I would like to express my gratitude to Claudio Mezzetti and Daniel Sgroi for all the fruitful conversations
we had. All the errors in this work are solely mine.
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fundamental question lies at the intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law and
di¤erent countries give di¤erent answers.
The proponents of interoperability3 argue that its presence guarantees that consumers
welfare is maximised at least in a static scenario. This is the dominant view in the European
Union where market leaders should provide compatibility information to rivals as failure to
do so is considered as a potential violation of Article 102 (ex article 82) of the European
Competition Law and leads to regulation by Courts enforcing the dominant rms to allow
compatibility4. A famous example comes from the most recent European Commission case
against Microsoft in 2008. It was related to the computer software giants refusal to pro-
vide its competitors technical information regarding its O¢ ce suite so that they could craft
software interoperable with Microsoft O¢ ce 20075. The case followed a complaint6 from
rms-members of the ECIS (European Committee of Interoperable Systems) and was put on
hold in December 2009 after Microsofts commitment to comply with the European Union
Competition Law7. Nevertheless, there are other important cases where the Commission
and European Courts ruled favouring a weaker protection for Intellectual Property Rights
owners. In Magill, the Commission found that the refusal by broadcasting companies to
license information protected by Copyright constituted an abuse of a dominant position.
This decision was upheld by the European Court of Justice which stated that although the
refusal to license copyright and lists of television programmes was not, per se, an abuse of a
dominant position, the "exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor may, in exceptional
circumstances, involve abusive conduct". The Court found that the exceptional circum-
stances involved the introduction of a new product which consumers wanted and the refusal
to license blocked its emergence. Thus, broadcasters were required to supply copyrighted
program schedules to a would-be supplier of a new product, not o¤ered by the copyright
3We use the terms interoperability, compatibility and connectivity interchangeably throughout the paper.
4See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/handbook_vol_1_en.pdf
5See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-19_en.htm
6See http://www.techhive.com/article/124813/article.html
7See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1941_en.htm?locale=en
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owners, for which the schedule information was indispensable8. This was the rst case that
tipped the balance in Europe between the Competition Law and the Intellectual Property
Law in favour of the former. In the case of IMS which is in the business of providing infor-
mation to the pharmaceutical industry on sales of pharmaceutical products in Germany, the
Commission and the Court of Justice faced the issue of whether a dominant service provider
could refuse to license an input that is a de-facto industry standard. The Court of Justice
a¢ rmed that it is su¢ cient for the license applicant to satisfy the three "cumulative" Mag-
ill conditions. Thus, the refusal to license Intellectual Property may, in itself, constitute a
breach of Article 82 where a) access is indispensable for carrying on a particular business,
b) resulting in the elimination of competition on a secondary market and c) preventing the
emergence of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand9. Conclusively,
refusing a license to prevent price competition is not considered, per se, as abusive, whereas
refusing a license with the e¤ect of preventing innovation is. It also remains a requirement
of the Magill test that denial of the license renders the introduction of the new product
impossible.
On the other hand, there are voices which argue that by giving up intellectual property
rights, dominant rmsincentives for innovation would be curbed. Among them, Thomas
Barnett of the United States Department of Justice argues that: "U.S. courts recognize the
potential benets to consumers when a company, including a dominant company, makes
unilateral business decisions, for example to add features to its popular products or license
its intellectual property to rivals, or to refuse to do so"10. Indeed, the U.S antitrust author-
ities conclude that "antitrust liability for mere unilateral, unconditional refusal to license
patents will not play a meaningful part in the interface between patent rights and antitrust
protections"11.
8See http://www.panix.com/~jesse/magill.html
9For more details on the IMS case see http://www.mofo.com/judgment-of-european-court-of-justice-in-
ims-health-v-ndc-health-05-18-2004/
10See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2007/226070.htm
11See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681_chapter7.htm
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Therefore, investigating rmsattitude towards interoperability and how these decisions
are related with their incentives to invest into improving the existing technology is very
important and this paper provides such an investigation. More precisely, it provides some
answers to the following questions: Will the dominant rm block interoperability with its
rivals or equivalently is exclusivity always generated in an unregulated market? Even if there
is incompatibility, does this de-facto mean that it is socially undesirable? Could a market
that compatibility is voluntary converge to interoperability when this is socially e¢ cient?
To answer these questions, a sequential game is built where two rms take turns in decid-
ing whether to invest in quality and allow interoperability with their rival. This model ts
a common pattern in durable, technology goods markets where the smaller rival may have
valuable ideas that emerge as follow-on innovations after the dominant rms invention hits
the market in a Schumpeterian scenario of creative destruction. Our analysis shows that the
dominant rm supports compatibility even if it could use a patent and exclude rivals when
the anticipated future quality improvement by the rival is relatively large. This is because
strategic pricing allows the market leader to extract more of the higher future surplus in
the present market. Regarding welfare, we nd that mandated compatibility by Antitrust
Bodies may lead to the ine¢ cient introduction of a negligibly innovative product while the
market where connectivity is not mandatory would maintain the previous version. On the
other hand, when network e¤ects are strong, a market where unilateral refusals to supply
interoperability are not ruled out by Competition Law could potentially lead to ine¢ cient
technological slowdown. When network e¤ects are weak, a laissez faire competition policy to-
wards the exercise of IPRs leads to social e¢ ciency and existing consumers are not better-o¤
when interoperability is enforced. Our conclusions cast some doubts on whether mandatory
interoperability, while trying to protect consumers from abusive behaviour, actually distorts
the market and leads to socially undesirable results without beneting them.
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1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes rst to the literature regarding rmsincentives towards compatibility
with their competitors. In a seminal paper, Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that rms with a
larger installed base will prefer to be incompatible with their rivals. In the same vein, Cremer,
Rey and Tirole (2000) analyze the competition between Internet backbone providers and
predict that a dominant rm may want to reduce the degree of compatibility with smaller
market players. Malueg and Schwartz (2006) nd that a rm with the largest installed
base will choose not to support connectivity with rms that are themselves compatible
when its market share exceeds fty percent or the potential to add consumers falls. A
similar result appears in Chen, Doraszelski and Harrington (2007) who consider a dynamic
setting with product compatibility and market dominance. They nd that if a rm gets a
larger market share, it may make its product incompatible. On the other hand, when rms
have similar installed bases, they make their products interoperable in order to expand the
market. Viecens (2009) di¤erentiates between direct and indirect network e¤ects by studying
platform competition between two rms where users buy a platform and its compatible
applications. By allowing for applications to be substitutes, complements or independent,
she considers compatibility in two dimensions. First, compatibility of the complementary
good, which she calls compatibility in applications. Second, she considers inter-network
compatibility where direct network externalities are present. She nds that the dominant
rm will never promote compatibility in applications. In contrast, both rms nd inter-
network compatibility protable. Focusing on direct network e¤ects and durable goods and
contrary to the literature, we nd that the dominant rm may support connectivity with its
rival. This happens when the quality improvement expected to be introduced by the smaller
rm is substantial.
Regarding welfare, Economides (2006) argues that it is socially e¢ cient to move towards
compatibility and similarly, Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that interoperability would raise
consumerssurplus. In a static environment, Viecens (2009) concludes that compatibility in
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the applications may be harmful for users and social welfare, particularly when asymmetries
are strong. Moreover, inter-network compatibility should not be supported by consumers.
We nd that interoperability could lead to dynamic ine¢ ciency depending on the industry
characteristics that are observable or can be estimated. Unlike an unregulated market, a
regime of compulsory compatibility may result in the ine¢ cient introduction of the higher
quality product while society would be better-o¤ without it. This occurs when innovation
happens with certainty and if the expected quality improvement is relatively small.
The second strand of literature that this paper relates to, has to do with rmsincentives
to upgrade their durable, network goods and how these decisions a¤ect social welfare. In
a monopolistic environment, Ellison-Fudenberg (2000) show that upgrades may occur too
frequently due to the rms inability to commit to whether it will choose to upgrade in the
future or not. Athanasopoulos (2013) extends Ellison-Fudenberg (2000) to a potential entry
scenario where compatibility between the rival rmsproducts is the status quo. He shows
that the incumbents commitment power adds an additional source of ine¢ cient upgrading
while potential or actual competition can harm social optimality. The present paper indicates
that in an unregulated market, the social and the private rmsincentives for upgrading are
aligned when quality improvements occur with certainty.
In the literature regarding sequential innovation, Scotchmer (1991, 1996), Scotchmer and
Green (1996) among others also study the case of single follow-on innovations. They focus
on the breadth and length of patents needed to secure the initial innovators incentives to
innovate when a second innovator threatens to innovate as well. They hold the view that
patents for the rst innovator should last longer when a sequence of innovative activity is
undertaken by di¤erent rms compared to the case that innovation is concentrated in one
rm. On the other hand, we are mainly interested in the interplay between IPRs protec-
tion through patents with rmsbehaviour towards compatibility. Contrary to the papers
addressed previously, we nd that the rst innovator will voluntarily o¤er compatibility to
rivals even if he can potentially use a patent because strategic pricing enables him to absorb
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more of the second period expected prot when he anticipates a large improvement from the
second innovator. In a related paper, Maskin and Bessen (2009) nd that when innovation
is sequential, patent protection is not as useful for encouraging innovation as in a static set-
ting. Our work shows that although the innovation incentives may indeed be curbed for the
smaller rival under a laissez faire Competition Law towards the exercise of IPRs, this fact
may be socially benecial. We also depart from all the papers above by considering a market
with durable, network goods and also the role of existing consumers in the determination of
social e¢ ciency.
2 The Model
Consider an industry where a durable, network good is currently supplied by the dominant
market player. He needs to pay a xed cost to improve his product quality and must also
decide whether to support interoperability with his competitor. When facing this set of
choices, the rm knows that in the subsequent period its rival will face a decision whether
to invest and allow connectivity.
A few remarks regarding compatibility are important. Following Malueg and Schwartz
(2006), compatibility in an unregulated economy requires both partiesconsent and cannot
be achieved unilaterally by using converters or adapters. In particular, in software, o¢ ce
suites markets, interoperability is accomplished through the relevant partiesdissemination
of interface information and through supporting a pre-existing Open Standard. Note that
licensing of Intellectual Property through inter-rm payments for compatibility is not allowed
and the rationale behind this decision is simple: royalties may lead to exclusion or collusion
and they are often ruled out by regulation12. In a nutshell, the choice of compatibility
involves no additional cost or benet both for the market leader and the smaller competitor.
Further to that and if connectivity is supported bilaterally, backward compatibility makes
12The case that (F)RAND (Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) payments are allowed between rms
that participate in Cooperative Standards Settings Organizations will be considered in future work.
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the upgraded good buyers able to open and save a document that was created with the
lower quality product while non-forward compatibility prevents the purchasers of the initial
versions from working with documents that are created with the upgrades.
The model is cast in discrete time and the sequence of events in the supply side is as
follows: originally (t = 0) there is no market as existing consumers (0) have purchased the
initial version of quality q0 in a past date and the dominant rm pays a xed amount F
(F > 0) for the improvement of his product quality from q0 to q113. At the beginning of
the rst period (t = 1), the market leader sets the price(s) for his product(s) and decides
whether to support compatibility by eliciting interoperability information about its version.
In the scenario he decides not to support compatibility, he can use a short-lived patent for
his invention that lasts until the second period. Note that as explained in the Introduction,
Article 102 of the European Union Competition Law (and in sharp contrast with the U.S
Antitrust Law) is considered to be potentially violated if the dominant rm refuses to reveal
interoperability information to rivals and in such a case, regulation leads to the enforcement
of compatibility. In the second stage of the rst period, the competitor must decide whether
to invest a xed amount F (F > 0) to create a follow-on product of higher expected quality
qe2. If she invests, Bertrand competition follows in the second period (t = 2) between the
rivals while if she doesnt, the dominant rm remains the sole supplier in the market. When
interoperability is not mandatory and following the market leaders decision of supporting
compatibility, the smaller rival also needs to decide whether she allows backward compat-
ibility with the dominant rms previous version (q1). It is important to stress that the
dominant rms potential choice of not supporting compatibility in a market that operates
under a laissez faire Competition Law towards the exercise of IPRs does not, per se, de-
ter the smaller rival from investing towards a better expected quality qe2. This happens as
information about the product of quality q1 is disseminated freely when it hits the market
and the rival can still use the Open Document Format to make a better product which will
13Our results would not change even if investing for the market leader becomes a decision and is not
considered as just a cost.
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be incompatible with q1. Moreover, products are durable and in particular, all versions are
assumed functional for two periods. Since price discrimination between the old and the new
consumers is possible, both the market leader (at t = 1) and the rival (at t = 2) have the
ability to o¤er upgrade prices to old users. Also note that rms are risk neutral and the
marginal cost of production is normalized to zero for all products.
On the demand side, consumers are identical and while at rst (t = 0) there is a mass
0 of customers in the economy, future generations arrive in constant ows t (t = 1; 2).
Their utility is linear in income and partially dependent on network e¤ects captured by a
parameter . So, if the buyer joins a network of mass x, the network benet is x: In
addition to the monetary cost, consumers also incur a learning cost c the rst time they
start to use the product followed by an upgrade cost cu (where cu < c) when learning to use
the new version(s) but without bearing any switching costs.
Customers present in the rst period are forward looking and base their purchasing
decisions on the products available and their prices as well as on their expectations. These
expectations reect the information they have regarding the future quality improvement, the
market size and future prices at the time they are called to make their decision and are fully
aligned in equilibrium. Unlike new customers (1) who cannot postpone their purchase, old
users (0) are not guaranteed to buy the new generation because of the durability of the
version they already own. Old customers(0) purchasing decisions given announced prices
resemble a coordination game and although it can have multiple equilibria, we assume they
coordinate to the Pareto optimal outcome. The same rule holds for the old consumers in
the second period (0 + 1) if the rival introduces the version of quality qe2 in the market.
In the similar coordination problem related to the new customerspurchasing decisions, the
standard assumption is that buyers with the same preferences act as if they were a single
player. Thus, after observing the available products and their prices, new customers in any
period (1, 2 in the rst and the second period, respectively) coordinate to what is best for
all of them. All consumers make their purchasing decisions simultaneously. Also note that
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the same discount factor  applies to all the agents in the economy.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model and the agentsmoves.
Figure 1: Timing of the agentsmoves. Note that at t = 1, the dominant rms potential
refusal to allow compatibility leads to regulation in the European Union mandating inter-
operability (and thus, qe2 and q1 being compatible). On the other hand, in the US, the same
dominant rms choice would lead to qe2 and q1 being incompatible.
3 Results
3.1 Market outcome
In this section, we explore the private rms incentives towards investing in quality and
supporting interoperability as well as their optimal pricing decisions. The next assumptions
hold throughout the paper:
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A1 Let q = q1   q0; qe  qe2   q1 denote the quality di¤erential in the rst and the
expected quality improvement in the second period, respectively. We assume: qe  q:
A2 qe + 2   cu  0:
A3 qe + 2   (0 + 1)  cu < 0 or qe < v:
A4 F < 2qe; F < 2[qe   (0 + 1)] when qe  (0 + 1):
In the context of sequential innovation and to stress that innovative ideas become more
di¢ cult with time, we assume that a given investment is expected to lead to a smaller
quality improvement in the future compared to the rst period. The second inequality
(qe+2 cu  0) says that even for negligible quality improvements, the market is growing
su¢ ciently quickly so that old customers in the second period (0 + 1) are expected to be
better-o¤ if they upgrade to the new generation qe2 when compatibility is present. The third
inequality (qe+2 (0+1)  cu < 0) stresses that the expected quality improvement
is bounded. Both these last two assumptions reduce the number of possible cases without
a¤ecting our results. Note that unless we assume that the values of the development cost
are relatively small, the smaller rm would not invest which would not be an interesting
scenario to analyze.
In a regime of mandatory connectivity, backward compatibility with the dominant rms
product enables the rival to benet by introducing even a slightly better product of quality
qe2
14. Note that in both economies where rms have the duty to supply interoperability
information to rivals or not, it is to the market leaders advantage to stop selling his old
version in the rst period because otherwise, keeping it in the market would cannibalize his
rst period prots. The next proposition summarizes the market outcome in an economy
where compatibility is mandatory:
Proposition 1 Under assumptions A2, A4 and in equilibrium, the dominant rm decides
to stop selling the old product of quality q0 in the rst period and instead, it sells the product
14See the Appendix for the analytical characterization of the market outcome under the interoperability
regime.
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q1 to the new and the old rst period customers. In the second period, the product of quality
qe2 is sold by the rival to the whole market. In particular, old customers (0 + 1) upgrade
for free.
In a laissez faire competition policy towards the exercise of IPRs, the competitor supports
interoperability if the leader has already chosen to allow connectivity. This occurs because
the resulting bigger network under compatibility in the second period allows the competitor
to charge a higher price to potential customers. On the other hand, the rival may be deterred
to invest if the dominant rm doesnt support compatibility15. Depending on the quality
improvement expected to be introduced by the competitor (qe) and for di¤erent values of
the investment (F ), we identify the following three assumptions and their respective scenarios
that lead to di¤erent equilibrium market outcomes:
A5 qe   (0 + 1)cu < F < (0 + 1)(qe + 2   cu): This scenario implies that the
expected quality improvement in the second period is relatively small (qe < (0 + 1)).
A6 F  qe   (0 + 1)cu; qe  (0 + 1): This scenario occurs when the quality
di¤erential anticipated to be introduced by the competitor is relatively large.
A7 F  qe  (0 +1)cu; qe < (0 +1): This scenario necessarily implies that the
network parameter is greater than the upgrading cost (  cu).
The next proposition summarizes the market equilibrium outcome in the economy that
operates under a laissez faire Competittion Law towards the exercise of IPRs:
Proposition 2 (a) If assumptions A1-A5 hold, in equilibrium, the dominant rm does not
support compatibility with its rival who is deterred to invest and all customers purchase the
product of quality q1:(b) If assumptions A1-A4 and A6 hold, in equilibrium, both competitors
support compatibility. In the rst period, all customers use q1 and in the second, the whole
market purchases the product of quality qe2:
15See the Appendix for the analytical characterization of the market outcome under the non-
interoperability regime.
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Think rst of (a) where the quality improvement expected to be introduced by the com-
petitor is relatively small (qe < (0+1)): By not supporting compatibility, the dominant
rm deters the rival from investing and when product functionality cannot be imitated, this
allows him to be the sole supplier in the second period. But this is not a su¢ cient condition
for not supporting compatibility as the dominant rm impedes interoperability even if prod-
uct functionality could be copied. To see this fact, think of the old customers in the rst
period (0). They are ready to pay more in the rst period if the dominant rm does not allow
compatibility with the rival mainly because the quality improvement under a regime of no
compatibility (q) is larger compared to the case that interoperability is present (qe). The
relatively small second period quality di¤erential if compatibility is supported also makes the
new customers in the rst period (1) willing to pay less if compatibility is allowed because
the cost of upgrading is larger than the expected quality improvement. On the other hand,
in (b), the expected quality di¤erential by the competitor is large (qe  (0 + 1)) and
the rival rm will unambiguously invest introducing the product of quality qe2 in the market
in the second period. In anticipation of this fact, the dominant rms optimal strategy is to
o¤er connectivity under a free licensing scheme to its competitor because it can absorb in
the rst period more of the expected discounted future total surplus which is higher when
compatibility is present.
3.2 Social optimum
It is important to analyze the social e¢ ciency of the results obtained previously and this
section considers the problem faced by a planner that maximizes social surplus.
In general, the planner desires compatibility between rival rmsproducts because due
to network e¤ects, customersutility and social welfare is maximised when interoperability
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is present. After normalizing the market size in the second period to unity (0+1+2 = 1)
and if the product of quality q1 is sold in both periods, social welfare is:
WN = 0[q1+q1+(0+1)+ cu]+1[q1+q1+(0+1)+ c]+2(q1+ c) F:
If the superior product of quality qe2 is sold to everyone, social welfare becomes:
WU = 0[q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   cu   cu] + 1[q1 + qe2 + (0 + 1) +   c  cu] +
+2(q
e
2 +   c)  F   F:
Comparing the expressions above yields the socially optimal outcome:
Proposition 3 It is socially e¢ cient if (a) the product of quality q1 is sold for two periods
when assumptions A2 and A5 hold; (b) the product of quality qe2 is introduced and purchased
by the whole market if assumptions A2 and A6 hold.
It is socially e¢ cient if the good of quality q1 is sold in the market for both periods
when the net benet from everyone purchasing it is smaller than the total investment and
upgrading cost (qe < F+cu(0+1)):When the last inequality is reversed, social optimality
is achieved when the superior product is introduced and purchased by the whole market.
Depending on the industry characteristics and the expected quality improvement, the
market outcome may lead to socially undesirable results. More precisely, the next proposition
highlights the potential ine¢ ciency that may arise in markets that operate under a laissez
faire Antitrust Law towards IPRs or not:
Proposition 4 (a) If assumption A5 holds and unlike the market that operates under a
laissez faire Competition Law towards IPRs, a regime of mandatory interoperability leads
to the ine¢ cient introduction of the product of quality qe2: (b) There is no ine¢ ciency in
the market where refusals to support interoperability are possible if the network parameter is
bounded and smaller than the cost of upgrading ( < cu). (c) If network e¤ects are strong
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(  cu), the market that operates under a laissez faire Competititon Law towards IPRs may
lead to an ine¢ cient technological slowdown when assumption A7 holds.
Lets rst think of the case where network e¤ects are not particularly strong and the
upgrading cost is relatively high ( < cu). When the total cost (investment plus consumers
upgrading cost) is relatively high (F  qe  cu(0 +1)), social e¢ ciency is obtained when
the version of quality q1 is retained in the market for both periods. At the same time, if the
expected quality improvement is relatively small (qe < (0 + 1)), non-compatibility in
a market where refusal to support compatibility is possible leads to the socially e¢ cient use
of the product of quality q1 for both periods. On the other hand, in a regime of compulsory
interoperability, the smaller rm introduces the product of quality qe2 and the old and the
new customers buy it while society would be better-o¤ without it. Note that old consumers
in the second period (0 + 1) are not worse-o¤ in the market where refusals to supply
interoperability information do not violate Competition Law.
When network e¤ects are greater than the learning cost (  cu), the same ine¢ ciency
potentially arises in a market that mandates compatibility. Note that for relatively small
values of the cost of development ((c) holds), it is socially e¢ cient to introduce the product
of quality qe2 in the market in the second period and nevertheless, the market where rms can
unilaterally refuse to supply interoperability information leads to technological slowdown by
ine¢ ciently withholding the product of quality qe2 from the economy.
4 Applications/ Discussion/ Future Research
This paper serves as a new contribution in understanding how rmsdecisions regarding
compatibility relate to their incentives to invest into improving their durable, network goods.
It is the rst attempt to introduce a new framework in the literature by using a sequential
game where the smaller rm can build on the dominant rms existing knowledge. Our
rst key result is that a dominant rm may indeed support compatibility with its rival
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and this happens when it anticipates a substantial quality improvement by the competitor.
These expectations allow him to extract in the rst period more of the higher total expected
surplus that emerges when interoperability is present. On the other hand, the rival rm
always supports compatibility because she can charge a higher price due to a larger network.
Moreover, an economy where refusal to supply interoperability information potentially
violates the antitrust Law may lead to the ine¢ cient introduction of a negligibly innovative
product. We also nd that when the network e¤ects are present but not particularly strong,
a market where compatibility is not mandatory converges to social e¢ ciency. On top of that,
existing customers are not worse-o¤ in an economy where interoperability is not enforced by
Law. When network e¤ects are strong, the refusal to support connectivity may lead to the
ine¢ cient slowdown of technological progress. To the best of my knowledge, these are new
results in the literature.
An important application captured by the model comes from the European Union case
against Microsoft regarding its o¢ ce suite highlighted earlier in the Introduction. Although
Microsofts compliance to compatibility was enforced by regulation, this mandate in favour
of interoperability was unnecessary and may have been socially harmful. In particular, Mi-
crosoft O¢ ce 2007 was followed by Corels WordPerfect O¢ ce suite in 2008 that introduced
negligible quality improvements with a high upgrading cost. In anticipation of this, the
technology giant decided not to support compatibility in the rst place. As proposition 4(a)
shows, society would be better-o¤ without the new product and the market under a laissez
faire Competition policy towards IPRs would lead to social e¢ ciency assuming that network
e¤ects are relatively weak.
The policy implication of these ndings is that the Antitrust Entities should investigate
whether mandating compatibility may sometimes be socially unwelcome without beneting
consumers and instead markets that allow unilateral refusals to supply interoperability in-
formation possibly lead to e¢ cient outcomes without necessarily hurting consumerswelfare.
In an economy where network e¤ects are present, this exercise is not trivial but one conclu-
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sion is certain: if network e¤ects are not too strong, an economy operating under a laissez
faire Competition Law towards IPs generates social e¢ ciency guaranteeing that existing
consumers are not worse-o¤ than in an economy under mandatory compatibility.
Nevertheless, there are a number of issues that are important and are not addressed in
the paper. Firstly, a model that will test empirically our results could validate our predic-
tions. Moreoever, further analysis could allow for interrm payments for compatibility on
a (F)RAND (fair, reasonable, non-discriminatroy) basis which is still not clearly dened in
the European Union. In addition, an ambitious work would include the same interoperabil-
ity/investment decisions from the rival rms in the presence of stochastic demand.
5 Appendix
5.1 Market outcome
5.1.1 Regime of Mandatory Interoperability
Period two New customers (2) are assumed to coordinate, given prices, to what is best
for all of them. Note that when interoperability is present, if customers buy the improved
product, they join a network of size 0 + 1 + 2 independently of what others do, where
without loss of generality, the size in the second period is normalized to unity. Thus, if they
choose to buy q2, their utility is q2 +  c  p22; where the rst and the second subscripts in
the price charged are related to the quality level of the product purchased and the type of
customers buying the good, respectively. If they choose to buy q1; the highest utility they
can achieve is q1 + 2 + (0 + 1)x1   c  p12 where x1 is the old customersfraction that
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sticks to q1: Thus, they will choose to buy q2 if:
q2 +   c  p22  q1 + 2 + (0 + 1)x1   c  p12 or
p22   p12  q + (0 + 1)(1  x1) (1)
If the old customers (0 +1) purchase q2; their utility is q2 +  cu  p21 independently
of other customerschoices. Using the fact that they purchased the product of quality q1 in
the previous period, their utility if they stick to it will be q1 + 2x2 + (0 + 1)x1; where
x1; x2 are the fractions of 0 + 1; 2 customers that either stick or buy q1 in the second
period. Thus, they will purchase q2 if:
q2 +   cu   p21  q1 + 2x2 + (0 + 1)x1 ,
p21  q + (0 + 1)(1  x1) + 2(1  x2)  cu (2)
Old customers are assumed to coordinate on the Pareto optimal outcome. That is, they
upgrade to q2 even if all other 0 + 1 stick to q1 (x1 = 1) when:
p21  q + 2(1  x2)  cu:
Note that p21 is a decreasing function of the number of 2 that buy q1: The competitors
choices are:
p22 = q + (0 + 1)(1  x1); p12 = 0 (1)
and for this price choice, old customers know that the new comers will purchase the product
q2 (x2 = 0),
p21  q + 2   cu (2)
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Thus, old customers are willing to pay up to q+2  cu (we will see that in equilibrium,
they will upgrade for free) and new customers pay p22 = q + (0 + 1) and get the new
product.
Period one Lets rst think of the new customers (1): If they buy q1; they expect that
they will upgrade to q2 in the following period. Thus, their total discounted expected utility
is: q1 + qe2 + (0 + 1) +    c   cu   p11   pe21; where pe21 is the price they expect to
pay in the second period.
If they buy the product of quality q0; in period two, there are some possibilities: If they
stick to q0; their second period utility is: q0 + 1x1 + 0x0 + 2x2; where x1; x0; x2 are
the fractions of 1; 0; 2 customers who stick or buy the product of quality q0; respectively.
If they buy q1; their second period utility is q1+1x
0
1+2x
0
2+0x
0
0  cu p11; where x00;
x
0
1; x
0
2 are the fractions of 0; 1; 2 consumers that buy or stick to q1; respectively: If they
buy q2; their second period utility is q2+  cu p21 independently of what other customers
do: Under a reluctant rule, 1 customers will choose q2 even if all other 1 customers buy q1
or stick to q0 if:
q2 +   cu   p21  maxfq0 + 1 + 0x0 + 2x2; q1 + 1 + 0x00 + 2x
0
2   cu   p11g:
In any case, the dominant rm can charge a higher price to the 1 customers by selling the
product of quality q1:
Lets now turn our attention to the old consumers (0): If they buy q1, they expect that
they will upgrade to qe2 in the second period. Thus, their total discounted expected utility is
q1+ q
e
2+(0+1)+   cu  cu p10  pe20: If they stick to q0, in period two and similar
to the previous analysis for the 1 customers, there are some possibilities: if they stick to q0;
their second period utility is: q0+0x0+a1x1+2x2 where x0; x1; x2 are the the di¤erent
consumersfractions that are expected to own the product of quality q0 in the second period.
If they buy q1, their second period utility is q1 + 0x
0
0 + a1x
0
1 + 2x
0
2   cu   p10, where
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x
0
0; x
0
1; x
0
2 are the second period fractions of 0; 1; 2 that are expected to own q1 in the
second period. If they buy q2; their utility is q2 +    cu   p20: In a reluctant rulewhere
old customers make their purchasing decisions independently of what other old customers
do, they will buy the superior product if:
q2 +   cu   pe020  maxfq1 + 0 + a1x
0
1 + 2x
0
2   cu   pe
0
10; q0 + 0 + 1x1 + 2x2g:
So, if they stick to q0 in the rst period, their total expected discounted utility is q0 + qe2 +
a0x
00
0 +1x
00
1 +   cu  pe020 where pe020 = qe2   q1 +2(1  x02) +1(1  x01): Thus, the
above expression reads: q0 + q1 +0x
00
0 + a1x
00
1 +   cu  2(1  x02)  1(1  x01):
So, if old customers use a reluctant rule, they will prefer to buy q1 in the rst period if:
q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   cu   cu   p10   pe20 
 q0 + q1 + 0 + a1x001 +   cu   2(1  x
0
2)  1(1  x
0
1)
or equivalently:
p10 + p
e
20  q + qe + 1(1  x
00
1) + 2(1  x
0
2) + 1(1  x
0
1)  cu + cu:
The price to the 0 customers is a decreasing function of the number of the new customers
who buy the product of quality q0 (x
00
1): Thus, the optimal dominant rms choice is to stop
selling the product of quality q0 in the rst period. Thus, the rst period optimal pricing
decisions are given by the expressions:
p11 + p
e
21 = q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   c  cu;
p10 + p
e
20 = q + q
e + 1 + 2(1  x02) + 1(1  x
0
1)  cu:
We observe that the expected payment that new and old customers are willing to pay in the
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rst period is xed. So, the dominant rms optimal choice is to set:
p11 = q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   c  cu (3)
p10 = q + q
e + 1 + 2(1  x02) + 1(1  x
0
1)  cu (4)
Thus, in the second period, the smaller rm will be induced to upgrade all old customers
(0 + 1) for free and this fact will not deter her from investing (note we have assumed a
relatively small cost of development).
Note that in the second period (1)and (2)give the equilibrium prices:
p22 = q
e + (0 + 1); p12 = 0; p21 = 0
and 2 buy the new product qe2 while old customers upgrade for free. From (3) and (4), we
also get the equilibrium rst period prices:
p11 = q1 + q
e
2 + (0 + 1) +   c  cu;
p10 = q + q
e + 1 + 2 + 1   cu
where in (4): x
0
2 = x
0
1 = 0 (the fractions of customers who are expected to buy or stick to q1
in the second period given p11 is observed by both the old and the new customers and the
expectations about the second period play).
5.1.2 Regime of no Interoperability
Period two Lets rst think about the new customers (2): If they all buy q2; their utility
is q2 + 2 + 1(1   x1) + 0(1   x0)   c   p22 and if they all buy q1; their utility is
q1 +2 +(1 +0)x1  c  p12; where x1; x2 are the old and new customersfractions that
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stick to q1: Thus, 2 customers will buy q2 if:
q2 + 1(1  x1) + 0(1  x0)  c  p22  q1 + 1x1 + 0x0   c  p12 ,
p22   p12  q + (0 + 1)(1  2x1): (5)
Old customers(0 + 1) utility if they purchase q2 is q2 + 0(1  x0) + 1(1  x1) +
2(1   x2)   cu   p21 while if they stick to q1 their utility is q1 + 2x2 + 1x1 + 0x0;
where x0; x1; x2 are the old and new customersfractions that stick or buy q1 in the second
period: In a reluctant rule, old customers will choose to buy q2 even if all other old customers
stick or buy q1 (x1 = x0 = 1) when:
q + 2(1  2x2)  (0 + 1)  cu  p21:
Our initial assumption rules out the possibility of the old customersupgrading in the second
period. Thus, the new potential customers know that x1 = 0 in (5), and this means that the
equilibrium depends on whether quality di¤erential in the second period is relatively high
[q  (0+1)] or not. If it is indeed the case that the quality di¤erential is not negligible,
the second period equilibrium prices set to the new customers are given by (5):
p22 = q   (0 + 1); p12 = 0
who in equilibrium, choose to buy the new product qe2: If not, the rival is deterred to invest.
Period one
Case 1: qe < (0 + 1): If 1 customers buy the good of quality q1 in the rst
period, their total expected discounted utility is q1 + q1 +(0 + 1) +   c  p11: If they
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buy q0; there are some possibilities in the future: if they stick to q0; their second period
utility will be q0+0x0+1x1+2x2, where x0; x1; x2 are the fractions of 0; 1; 2 who
own the initial version, respectively while if they buy q1; their utility is q1 +    cu   p110
independently of what other customers do. Thus, if they use a reluctant rule, 1 customers
will buy the product of quality q1 even if all other 1 stick to q0 if:
q1 +   cu   p011  q0 + 1 + 0x0 + 2x2:
So, their total expected discounted utility if they buy q0 in the rst period is q0 + q1 +
0x0 + 1x1 +    c   cu   p01   p011. It is clear that the dominant rm can charge
a higher price by selling the product of quality q1 to the new customers rather than the
product of quality q0:
Lets now turn our attention to the old consumers in the rst period (0): If they buy
the product of quality q1; their total expected discounted utility is q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) +
  cu   p10: If they stick to q0; there are some possibilities in the following period: if they
keep q0; their second period utility is q0+0x
0
0+1x
0
1+2x
0
2: If they buy q1; their utility
will be q1+  cu  pe10: Thus, they will buy the higher quality product in the second period
when they use the reluctant rule if:
q1 +   cu   pe10  q0 + 0 + 1x
0
1 + 2x
0
2 ,
pe10  q + 1(1  x
0
1) + 2(1  x
0
2)  cu:
Recalling that q > cu, the price expected to be set by the dominant rm in the second
period is pe10 = q + 1(1   x01) + 2(1   x02)   cu and 0 customers buy the product of
quality q1: Thus, their expected total discounted utility if they stick to the initial version
q0 is q0 + q1 + 0x0 + 1x1 +    cu   pe10: Since old customers decide to upgrade to
q1 even if all other old consumers stick to q0, old customers in the rst period purchase the
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product of quality q1 if:
q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) +   cu   p10  q0 + q1 + 0 + 1x1 +   cu   pe10 ,
p10  q + 1(1  x1)  cu + cu + pe10:
Notice that since the dominant rms prots are a decreasing function of the number of 1
customers that buy q0 in the rst period (x1); the optimal dominant rms choice is to stop
selling the initial version in the rst period (thus x1 = 0 in the last inequality above). Thus,
the equilibrium rst and second period prices are given by the expressions:
p11 = q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) +   c;
p10 = q + 1   cu + cu + pe10; where
pe10 = q + 1 + 2   cu;
p12 = q1 +   c:
Case 2: qe  (0 + 1): Lets rst think of the new customers in the rst period
(1). If they buy the product of quality q1, their expected utility is q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) +
(0+1) c p11 because they expect not to upgrade to qe2 in the following period: If they
buy q0; there are some possibilities in the second period: If they stick to q0; their utility is
q0+0x0+1x1+2x2: If they buy q1; their second period utility is q1+0x00 +1x
0
1+
2x
0
2  cu  p11 while if they buy q2; their utility is q2 + 0x000 + 1x001 + 2x002   cu  p21:
It is clear that the dominant rm can charge more the new rst period customers by selling
the product of quality q1:
Lets now turn our attention to the old customers in the rst period (0): If they upgrade
to q1, their total expected discounted utility is q1 + q1 +(0 + 1) + (0 + 1)  cu  p10
where they anticipate that they will not buy the superior product of quality q2 in the second
period and the new second period customers are expected to buy the qe2. If they keep
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q0; there are some possibilities in the second period: if they stick to the initial version,
their second period utility is q0 + 0x0 + 1x1 + 2x2: If they buy q1, their utility is
q1 + 0x
0
0 + 1x
0
1 + 2x
0
2   cu   p10 whereas if they choose to buy the product of quality
q2; their utility is q2 + 0x
00
0 + 1x
00
1 + 2x
00
2   cu   p20: They will buy q2 in the second
period even if all 0 buy q1 (both these choices strictly dominate all 0 keeping q0 in the
second period) if:
q2 + 0 + 1x
00
1 + 2x
00
2   cu   p20 
 maxfq1 + 0 + 1x01 + 2x
0
2   cu   p10; q0 + 0x0 + 1x1 + 2x2g
and thus
p20 = q
e   1(x001   x
0
1) + 2(x
00
2   x
0
2); p10 = 0:
Thus, their total expected discounted utility if they buy q0 is q0 + qe2 + 0x
000
0 + 1x
000
1 +
0x
0000
0 + 1x
0000
1 + 2x
0000
2   cu   p20 where p20 is given above. These consumers will
buy q1 in the rst period even if all others choose q0 if:
q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) + (0 + 1)  cu   p10 
 q0 + qe2 + 0 + 1x
000
1 + 0x
0000
0 + 1x
0000
1 + 2x
0000
2   cu   p20 (6)
Since p10 is a decreasing function of the number of 1 customers who buy q0 in the rst
period, the dominant rms optimal choice is to stop selling q0 in the rst period (thus,
x
000
1 = 0 in the inequality above). This means that the equilibrium price set to 1 customers
is:
p11 = q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) + (0 + 1)  c:
Old rst period customers observe this price and know that 1 customers buy the product
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of quality q1 in the rst period. Moreover,
p20 = q
e   1 + 2
because old customers expect the new rst period customers (1) to buy q1 in the rst period
and 2 customers to buy qe2 in the second period. Note that in the alternative scenario that
old customers stick to q0; they expect p20 in the second period as well as for this p20 the old
(0) to buy q2 just like the 2 (1 are not expected to upgrade to q2) and thus, x
0000
0 = 1;
x
0000
1 = 0 and x
0000
2 = 1. (6) gives the equilibrium price set to the old rst period customers:
p10 = q + 1   cu + cu;
To recap, in this case, the equilibrium prices charged as well as the prots for both competi-
tors are given by the expressions:
p11 = q1 + q1 + (0 + 1) + (0 + 1)  c:
p10 = q + 1   cu + cu;
p22 = q
e   (0 + 1); p12 = 0:
The dominant rm compares its expected prot under the two regimes and decides whether
to support compatibility or not.
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